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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN ENGLAND: THE EMERGENCE
OF A NEW REMEDY
D.G.T. WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
A new remedy, the "application for judicial review," came into
operation in England and Wales early in 1978 through adoption of
the new Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.1 Order 53 is
not the only remedy available for judicial control of executive ac-
tion. Parties may seek the private remedies of declarations and in-
junctions, special statutes in a variety of contexts provide either
for processes of appeal to the courts or for other prescribed ave-
nues of access to the courts, and parties may challenge executive
action collaterally in ordinary civil proceedings or as part of the
defence to a criminal prosecution.2 The House of Lords, however,
ruled in O'Reilly v. Mackman' that whenever possible parties
should employ the application for judicial review provided under
Order 53. Lord Denning M.R., in the Court of Appeal, stated that
an Order 53 application "should be the normal recourse in all cases
of public law where a private person is challenging the conduct of a
public authority or a public body, or of anyone acting in the exer-
cise of a public duty.' 4 Perhaps more firmly, Lord Diplock said
during consideration by the House of Lords:
* Rouse Ball Professor of English Law, University of Cambridge; President, Wolfson Col-
lege, Cambridge.
1. The Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 3), STAT. INST., 1977, No. 1955, § 5.
Two later amendments have been made to Order 53. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, §
31; The Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 4), STAT. INST., 1980, No. 2000, §§ 2-
7.
2. For descriptions of remedies available in English administrative law, see P. BIRKIN-
SHAW, GRIEVANcEs, REMEDIES AND THE STATE 163-86 (1985); P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
527-625 (1983); S. DE SMITH, JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 379-583 (4th ed.
1980); C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS. LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 284-310 (1984); H. WADE, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 319-409 (5th ed. 1982).
3. [1983] 2 A.C. 237 (1982).
4. Id. at 256.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
[I]t would in my view as a general rule be contrary to public
policy, and as such an abuse of the process of the court, to per-
mit a person seeking to establish that a decision of a public au-
thority infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection
under public law to proceed by way of an ordinary action and by
this means to evade the provisions of Order 53 for the protection
of such authorities.5
This doctrine of "exclusivity"" is entirely judge-made and, in fact,
is contrary to the view expressed by the Law Commission in its
report of 1976 which led to the adoption of the new remedy."
Before O'Reilly, judicial views concerning the desirability of ex-
clusivity conflicted,8 and these conflicting views were reflected in
the decisions of the lower courts considering O'Reilly. The judge at
first instance in O'Reilly emphasised that, because the law offered
a litigant a choice between the application for judicial review pro-
cedure under Order 53 and the private remedies of declarations
and injunctions, a suggestion that the litigant is abusing the pro-
cess of the court "because he exercises the choice in the way he
thinks best in his own interest" would be "an abuse of language."'
The House of Lords was unimpressed with this view, but the appli-
cation of the doctrine of exclusivity nonetheless has not been an
easy process.
5. Id. at 285.
6. See Forsyth, Beyond O'Reilly v. Mackman: The Foundations and Nature of Proce-
dural Exclusivity, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 415 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Forsyth, Procedural
Exclusivity]; Forsyth, The Principle of O'Reilly v. Mackman: A Shield But Not a Sword?,
1985 PUB. L. 355; McBride, The Doctrine of Exclusivity and Judicial Review: O'Reilly v.
Mackman, 2 Civ. JusT. Q. 268 (1983).
7. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 1976, CMD. 6407, No.
73, 34 [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON REMEDIES]. The Law Commission, which was set up
by the Law Commissions Act, 1965, earlier had published a working paper stating a provi-
sional view in favour of exclusivity. LAW COMMISSION, REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
1971, WORKING PAPER No. 40, 11 75-82.
8. See, e.g., Uppal v. Home Office, [1978] T.L.R., No. 719 (C.A. Nov. 11, 1978); Bousfield
v. North Yorkshire County Council, [1982] T.L.R., No. 126 (Q.B. Mar. 4, 1982) (Dillon J.);
Irlam Brick Co. Ltd. v. Warrington Borough Council, [1982] T.L.R., No. 50 (Q.B. Feb. 5,
1982) (Woolf J.); Heywood v. Hull Prison Bd. of Visitors, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1386 (Ch.). See
generally J. BEATSON & MIv MArHEws, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 335
(1983) (setting out many other such cases).
9. [1983] 2 A.C. at 250 (Peter Pain J.). Similar views also were expressed in the Court of
Appeal by Ackner L.J. and O'Connor L.J. See id. at 260-66 (Ackner L.J.); id. at 266-67
(O'Connor L.J.).
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One case concerning the important question of parliamentary
constituency boundaries,1e in which legal argument already had oc-
cupied four days in the Chancery Division of the High Court, was
transferred to and restarted in the Queen's Bench Division," and
an immediate decision of the House of Lords endorsing O'Reilly
may have given the impression that differences of view and diffi-
culties of application were at an end.1 2 Subsequent litigation, how-
ever, suggests otherwise. Rulings of the House of Lords and other
courts tend to the conclusion that, while O'Reilly unquestionably
established a presumption that litigants should use the application
for judicial review, the availability of exceptions to that presump-
tion of exclusivity will have to be worked out on a case-by-case
basis.' 3 In particular, courts have expressed an uneasiness about
the "newly fledged distinction in English law between public and
private law, "14 warning that terms such as "public law" and "pri-
vate law" should "be used with caution, for, typically, English law
fastens, not upon principles but upon remedies."'15
10. R. v. Commissioners of the Boundary Comm'n for England, ex parte Gateshead Bor-
ough Council, [1983] T.L.R., No. 7 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. Jan. 5, 1983), afl'd sub nom. R. v. Bound-
ary Comm'n for England, ex parte Foot, [1983] Q.B. 600 (C.A.).
11. See The Times of London, Dec. 7, 1982, at 4; The Times of London, Nov. 26, 1982, at
2.
12. See Cocks v. Thanet Dist. Council, [1983] 2 A.C. 286 (1982).
13. See Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1986] 1 A.C. 112 (1985);
Wandsworth London Borough Council v. Winder, [1985] A.C. 461 (1984); Davy v.
Spelthorne Borough Council, [1984] A.C. 262 (1983); R. v. East Berkshire Health Auth., ex
parte Walsh, [1985] Q.B. 152 (C.A. 1984); Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd.,
[1983] 1 W.L.R. 1302 (C.A.); R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Benwell, [1985] 1 Q.B. 554
(1984) (Hodgson J.); R. v. British Broadcasting Corp., ex parte Lavelle, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 23
(Q.B. 1982) (Woolf J.).
14. Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1986] 1 A.C. 112, 178 (1985)
(Lord Scarman). Gillick concerned a departmental circular giving advice about the propri-
ety of a doctor at a family planning clinic prescribing contraceptives for a girl under 16
years of age, with the issue of parental consent at the heart of the dispute. See id. at 162-63
(Lord Fraser).
15. Davy v. Spelthorne Borough Council, [1984] A.C. 262, 276 (1983) (Lord Wilberforce).
Lord Wilberforce went on to say:
We have not yet reached the point at which mere characterisation of a claim
as a claim in public law is sufficient to exclude it from consideration by the
ordinary courts: to permit this would be to create a dual system of law with the
rigidity and procedural hardship for plaintiffs which it was the purpose of the
recent reforms to remove.
Id.; see Forsyth, Procedural Exclusivity, supra note 6, at 423-32.
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF ORDER 53 AND THE DOCTRINE OF
EXCLUSIVITY
A. Availability of Private Remedies
The overriding purpose behind O'Reilly is to ensure that, when
litigants challenge executive action in the courts within the ac-
cepted scope of judicial review,16 they normally should not enjoy
the option of seeking a declaration or an injunction. The decision
does not affect special statutory remedies. Prior to the reforms
that began with the amendment of Order 53 in 1977, a litigant had
an unquestioned option either to follow the route of the preroga-
tive orders or to follow the route of the private remedies. The lat-
ter option had developed through the twentieth century as an al-
ternative to the prerogative orders, which at least in theory were
weighed down with outdated, often artificial rules and require-
ments. In a lecture delivered in 1949, Lord Denning stated that the
prerogative orders were "not suitable for the winning of freedom in
the new age. They must be replaced by new and up to date ma-
chinery, by declarations, injunctions, and actions for negligence. '1 7
An American scholar spoke in a similar vein in urging that the en-
tire set of prerogative orders be thrown "into the Thames River,
heavily weighted with sinkers to prevent them from rising again." 8
The procedural limitations associated with the prerogative or-
ders before these reforms included complex rules concerning locus
standi, an absence of specific provisions for discovery and interrog-
atories, an opportunity to cross-examine on affidavits only in the
most exceptional circumstances, a six-month time limit for seeking
certiorari, and a rule that applications for prerogative orders could
not be joined with any other remedies. In addition, litigants had to
16. For discussions of the scope of, and grounds for, judicial review of administrative ac-
tion, see S. DE SMITH, supra note 2, at 93-376; H. WADE, supra note 2, at 213-409. In Austra-
lia, the grounds for review, most of which are familiar in English law, have been enumerated
by statute at the federal level. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977, §§ 5-6;
see G. FLICK, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 183-205 (1983); S. HOTOP, PRINCIPLES OF Aus-
TRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 327-54 (6th ed. 1985).
17. A. DENNING, FREEDOM UNDER THE LAW 126 (1949) (quoted in O'Reilly, [1983] 2 A.C. at
259).
18. Davis, The Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England: A Problem of Practical
Jurisprudence, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 200, 204 (1961).
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obtain leave to apply for a prerogative order.19 These limitations
did not apply, and still do not apply, to ordinary private actions,
save that the rules governing locus standi for declarations and in-
junctions were at least as strict as those that applied to prerogative
orders prior to the reforms.20 The use of declarations and injunc-
tions was subject to other limitations, including the rule that in-
terim declaratory orders are not recognised in law2' and the rule
that injunctions do not lie against the Crown. 22 The private reme-
dies, however, seemed less inhibited by the restrictions and as-
sumptions of the past, and many observers, including Lord Den-
ning, regarded them as the possible focus for a reform of remedies
in administrative law. Instead, the reforms were built around the
prerogative orders.
B. Reform of Administrative Law Remedies: The New Order 53
The application for judicial review under the new Order 53, is-
sued in 1977, allows litigants to choose one or more of five reme-
dies-orders of certiorari, orders of prohibition, orders of manda-
mus, declarations, and injunctions. The court also may award
damages if the litigant could .have received them in a private ac-
tion.23 The High Court may grant a declaration or injunction if it
regards that remedy as just and convenient after it considers "the
19. For a brief summary of these limitations, see REPORT ON REMEDIES, supra note 7,
12-21; see also B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 216-20 (1972)
(discussing these limitations).
20. See REPORT ON REMEDIES, supra note 7, 1 22-30 (concerning declarations and injunc-
tions generally).
21. See International Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, [1962] Ch.
784 (C.A.). More recently, the Law Commission has favoured the introduction of a form of
interim declaratory order. See REPORT ON REMEDIES, supra note 7, % 51-52. Judicial views,
however, remain divided. See Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Rossminster Ltd., [1980] A.C. 952
(1979) (House of Lords reversed decision of the Court of Appeal allowing interim declara-
tory order); Codelfa-Cogefar (N.Z.) Ltd. v. Attorney-General, [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 153, 160-62
(H.C.) (White J.).
22. This rule, and the meaning of "the Crown," were discussed in Town Invs. Ltd. v.
Department of the Env't, [1978] A.C. 359 (1977), in whih Lord Simon said: "'[T]he Crown'
and 'Her Majesty' are terms of art in constitutional law ..... '"Crown" includes all the
departments of the central government."' Id. at 398 (quoting E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, CON-
sTrrUTIONAL LAW 264 (3d ed. 1946)).
23. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 31(4). For a discussion of the difficult and evolving
law governing damage awards in administrative law, see H. WADE, supra note 2, at 673.
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nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by
orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari," "the nature of
the persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by
such orders," and "all the circumstances of the case."24 Order 53
does not expressly affect the private remedies of declarations and
injunctions obtained by writ or originating summons, which, of
course, operate in wide areas of "private" as well as "public" law.
For declarations and injunctions under the application for judicial
review, however, the statutory guidance indicates that courts
should use them broadly only in "the same sphere as that in which
the prerogative remedies themselves operate."2 5 In other words,
declarations and injunctions issued under Order 53 are custom-
built for the purposes of judicial review of administrative action.
Any application for a prerogative order clearly has to be brought
under Order 53. The language of the primary and subordinate leg-
islative provisions applicable to Order 53, however, seems to allow
a prospective litigant the option of seeking a declaration or an in-
junction either under Order 53 or by writ or originating summons.
The availability of such an option evidently troubled some judges
more and more after Order 53 became effective, and this uncer-
tainty eventually led to the decision in O'Reilly.
The ruling of the House of Lords in O'Reilly does much to ex-
plain the underlying difficulties and constraints of administrative
law. Order 53, as amended, is designed both to simplify the proce-
dure for individual citizens and organisations seeking relief against
public authorities and to protect public authorities from harass-
ment or obstruction through the process of judicial review. Because
it embodies safeguards from each direction, courts now regard Or-
der 53, in light of the decision in O'Reilly, as the appropriate me-
dium for case-by-case development of the law, and the onus rests
on those who seek as an alternative to pursue other remedies.
This onus may be discharged, however, in cases of considerable
complexity.26 The nature of the subject matter of a case also may
influence the attitude of the courts, which are exploring the range
24. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 31(2).
25. H. WADE, supra note 2, at 573.
26. In O'Reilly, Lord Denning M.R. gave the example of Air Canada v. Secretary of State,
[1983] 2 A.C. 394. O'Reilly, [1983] 2 A.C. at 258-59.
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of possible exceptions to the presumption in favour of exclusivity.
O'Reilly itself was the latest in a series of cases concerning prison-
ers' rights, and Lord Denning M.R. referred in his judgment to ar-
eas such as homelessness and immigration, in which litigants had
sought to move otherwise than through Order 53.27 Designation of
the exceptions is important, especially to enable lawyers to advise
clients about appropriate remedies. With the presumption in fa-
vour of exclusivity, however, the task of identifying the outstand-
ing features of Order 53 is equally important.
The discretionary nature of Order 53 remedies, and of the two
main private remedies of declarations and injunctions, continues to
be important. Indeed, the judge at first instance in O'Reilly re-
garded the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or rejecting a
remedy at the conclusion' of a trial as the means to correct a
plainly inappropriate remedy choice.28 Lord Diplock, who spoke for
a unanimous House of Lords, saw judicial discretion to deal with
such a choice summarily at the outset, by ruling it an abuse of the
process of the court, as essential to the interests of public policy.29
One should not interpret Lord Diplock's view, however, as denying
the general importance of judicial discretion exercised at the con-
clusion of proceedings °.3  As one commentator recently indicated,
"the courts have not attempted to lay down firm guidelines" for
the exercise of that discretion,31 perhaps meaning that a significant
element of unpredictability concerning judicial discretion is inevi-
table and that the reforms achieved in Order 53 have not made
any difference in this regard.2
27. [1983] 2 A.C. at 257. Lord Denning expressed concern about giving these litigants
broad remedial options: "Nearly all these people are legally-aided. If they were allowed to
proceed by ordinary action, without leave, I can well see that the public authorities of this
country would be harassed by all sorts of claims-long out of time-on the most flimsy of
grounds." Id. at 257-58.
28. Id. at 245-46.
29. Id. at 284.
30. See, e.g., R. v. Diggines, ex parte Rahmani, [1985] 1 Q.B. 1109 (C.A. 1984); R. v. St.
Edmundsbury Borough Council, ex parte Investors in Indus. Comm'l Properties Ltd., [1985]
1 W.L.R. 1168 (Q.B.); R. v. Broadcasting Complaints Comm'n, ex parte Owen, [1985] 1 Q.B.
1153.
31. C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 285.
32. Order 53 has made little or no difference in some other respects as well. For example,
some limitations on the individual remedies, such as the understanding that certiorari and
1986]
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One of the objectives behind the reforms was to inject into Order
53 procedural advantages previously enjoyed only by those pursu-
ing the private remedies. In the area of discovery, for instance, the
Law Commission was anxious that a specific power be vested in
the court to order such discovery as it considered appropriate. Dis-
covery, then, would not be automatic as in ordinary actions, to
avoid "unnecessary delay and expense" in straightforward cases.
The Commission recommended a similar specific power for inter-
rogatories and for cross-examination of persons making affidavits.33
The Law Commission's proposals were adopted in the new Order
53.34 Lord Diplock explained the importance of this rule in his
speech in O'Reilly, urging, for example, that courts allow cross-
examination of deponents on their affidavits "whenever the justice
of the particular case so requires."3 5 Ironically, in the Court of Ap-
peal Lord Denning M.R. saw the provision for a special power to
cover these interlocutory applications as a restraint on the abuse of
judicial review. Cross-examination, he said, "can roam unchecked
in ordinary actions, but is kept within strict bounds in judicial re-
view. It is rarely allowed. '36
More obviously designed as a restraint is the provision of a time
limit for applications under Order 53. The six-month period apply-
ing to certiorari prior to 1971 now has been reduced to three
months for Order 53 proceedings, unless the court finds a "good
reason for extending the period within which the application shall
be made. '37 Even within the three-month period, the applicant
must act promptly, and the court must exercise judicial discretion
in this area with the interests of the applicant and of the adminis-
tration in mind.38 As an Australian judge recently noted:
prohibition apply only to "judicial" functions of the administration, to a large extent have
evaporated without any legislative prompting. See H. WADE, supra note 2, at 551-58.
33. See REPORT ON REMEDIES, supra note 7, 49.
34. The Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 3), STAT. INST., 1977, No. 1955, § 5,
rule 8.
35. [1983] 2 A.C. at 283.
36. Id. at 257.
37. The Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 3), STAT. INST., 1977, No. 1955, § 5,
rule 4.
38. For a careful analysis of this provision in Order 53, see R. v. Stratford-on-Avon Dist.
Council, ex parte Jackson, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1319 (C.A.) (Ackner L.J.) (delay caused by the
time taken to obtain legal aid). For recent examples of this discretion in action, see R. v.
722 [Vol. 27:715
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It is in the public interest that the administration of the law
should not be inappropriately hampered by the extension of in-
dulgences to undeserving persons, but it is in accordance with
justice and the public interest that a citizen should not lose an
entitlement by delay which is neither reprehensible or
excessive.-"
Both the three-month time limit and the urgency that attaches
to an application under Order 53 once it is launched reflect the
concern for speed in the process of judicial review. In an important
1984 case concerning subordinate legislation, which involved issues
of European Economic Community law, parliamentary privilege,
and judicial restraint, Sir John Donaldson gave this description of
the stages in the application for review in that case:
On 28 November 1984 Mr. Smedley obtained leave from
Hodgson J. to apply for relief by way of judicial review. His ap-
plication came before Woolf J. on 6 December and was dis-
missed on 7 December. His appeal to this court was heard on 12
and 13 December and, but for the fact that we received a mes-
sage to the effect that a judgment given today would be as satis-
factory as one given earlier and we welcomed the opportunity to
put our judgments into writing, we had intended to give judg-
ment on 14 December. Bearing in mind that at each stage the
matter has been fully argued, there can be and is no complaint
that the courts or the practitioners have been dilatory. Indeed in
some other jurisdictions the timetable would be regarded with
some surprise, not to say envy. I mention the matter not in any
spirit of complacency, but merely in order to counterbalance the
British Rys. Bd., ex parte Great Yarmouth Borough Council, [1983] T.L.R., No. 188 (Q.B.
Mar. 15, 1984) (grant of time extension in ex parte application may be revoked at inter
partes hearing); R. v. Chester Justices, ex parte Holland, [1984] T.L.R., No. 81 (Q.B. Feb.
18, 1984) (allowing time extension); R. v. Greenwich Borough Council, ex parte Cedar
Transp. Group Ltd., [1983] T.L.R., No. 555 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. Aug. 3, 1983) (stressing the need
for promptness within the three months); R. v. Swansea City Council, ex parte Main, The
Times of London, Dec. 23, 1981, at 17, col. 4 (C.A. Dec. 18, 1981) (rejecting time extension).
39. Intervest Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 3 F.C.R. 591, 599 (Austl. Fed.
Ct. 1984) (Smithers J.); see also Hunter Valley Devs. Pty. Ltd. v. Cohen, 3 F.C.R. 344, 348-
49 (Austl. Fed. Ct. 1984) (Wilcox J.) (explaining the criteria that the courts might adopt in
considering applications for time extensions).
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well justified complaints which are sometimes made of the law's
delays.40
The "new face of judicial review" that has emerged since 1977 is
based to no small extent on the active determination of the judges
to avoid unnecessary delay. In a variety of ways, which have been
explained fully by a leading Queen's Counsel,4 a new streamlined
machinery manned by a corps of specialised judges in the Queen's
Bench Division42 has led to a state of affairs in which "as soon as
the application for leave [is] made it provide[s] a very speedy
means, available in urgent cases within a matter of days rather
than months, for determining whether a disputed decision was
valid in law or not. ' 43 In his speech in O'Reilly, Lord Diplock was
prepared to concede that prior to 1977 a litigant concerned about
the procedural handicaps associated with prerogative orders prop-
erly might have chosen to pursue the private remedies instead,
"despite the fact that, by adopting this course, the plaintiff evaded
the safeguards imposed in the public interest against groundless,
unmeritorious or tardy attacks upon the validity of decisions made
by public authorities in the field of public law."'44 Since 1977, his
Lordship stressed, those handicaps largely had been overcome by
changes of law and practice, and the presumption of exclusivity
hence should apply.
An assessment of the principal features of the new Order 53,
however, must include a discussion of two other relevant proce-
dural requirements-leave to apply for judicial review, and stand-
ing. Standing is a concept shared by all common law jurisdictions,
and therefore it is relatively familiar to American readers. Leave to
apply for judicial review, on the other hand, is a distinctive feature
of the English system of judicial review. The very existence of a
leave requirement in England is intimately bound up with judicial
40. R. v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte Smedley, [1985] Q.B. 657, 664-65 (C.A. 1984). For a
summary of Sir John Donaldson's contributions to the acceleration of administrative law
cases, see Blota-Cooper, The New Face of Judicial Review: Administrative Changes in Or-
der 53, 1982 PUB. L. 250, 257.
41. See Blom-Cooper, supra note 40.
42. See O'Reilly, [1983] 2 A.C. at 259 (Lord Denning).
43. Id. at 281 (Lord Diplock).
44. Id. at 282. Lord Diplock also discussed other procedural features of Order 53 in the
course of his speech. See id. at 282-85.
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attitudes toward standing, and it ultimately may prove to provide
a more effective and realistic check on litigation in administrative
law than ever can be achieved through rules of standing.
III. STANDING AND LEAVE REQUIREMENTS IN THE WAKE OF THE
NEW ORDER 53
A. The Requirement of Leave
1. In General
The requirement of leave to apply for judicial review applied to
the prerogative orders even before 1977, and the Law Commission,
taking into account the preliminary findings of an empirical study
concerning the working of the Queen's Bench Divisional Court,
favoured its retention in any revised Order 53: "[A] procedure
which provides an expeditious method whereby the Court can sift
out the cases with no chance of success at relatively little cost to
the applicant and no cost to any prospective respondent would
seem at first impression worthy of retention."45 The Commission
explained that from 1971 to 1975 inclusive the proportion of cases
in which courts refused leave to apply for a prerogative order
amounted to just over one-third of the applications made.46 In civil
cases 47 under Order 53 in 1982, leave was granted in 347 cases and
refused in 168; in 1983, it was granted in 494 cases and refused in
176; in 1984, it was granted in 542 cases and refused in 161; and in
1985, it was granted in 644 cases and refused in 304.48
The revised Order 53, as amended in 1980, requires an applica-
tion for leave in civil matters to be ex parte to a single judge, with
very little documentation. Unless otherwise asked, the judge may
determine the application without a hearing. If the judge refuses or
45. REPORT ON REmFiES, supra note 7, 1 38.
46. Id. 37.
47. A large number of applications for judicial review relate to criminal matters, espe-
cially proceedings before magistrates' courts. See 461 PARL. DEB., H.. (5th ser.) 443-44
(1985) (Lord Hailsham) (noting that about one-third of all leave applications are in criminal
matters).
48. LAw COMMISSION, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1985, CM. 9864, at 18 (Table 1.15); LAw CoM-
MISSION, JuDIcIAL STATISTICS, 1984, Cmw. 9599, at 18 (Table 1.15); LAw COMMISSION, JUDICILL
STATISTICS, 1983, Cm. 9370, at 19 (Table 1.15); LAw COMMISSION, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1982,
CmD. 9065, at 17 (Table 1.14); see P. BamuNsHAw, supra note 2, at 173.
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grants leave on terms, the applicant may renew the application
before a single judge in open court or, if the court so directs, before
a divisional court. From a refusal of leave at this stage, an appli-
cant may further appeal, or renew application, to the Court of
Appeal, but no further.49 Until recently, the Court of Appeal, if
minded to grant leave, often proceeded to determine at that stage
the application for judicial review on its merits rather than refer-
ring the application back to the High Court. On several occasions,
Lord Denning took advantage of this option while presiding over
or participating as a member of the Court of Appeal.50 The availa-
bility of this option, however, ended with a Practice Direction of
the Queen's Bench Division in 1983,51 thus stopping what Lord
Hailsham L.C. described as a "quite illegal assumption of a juris-
diction at first instance. '52
Some individuals contend that an appeal from refusal to grant
leave should not lie in any circumstances. In the Administration of
Justice Bill, 1985, when that bill came before the House of Lords
in its legislative capacity, clause 43 initially purported to remove
the right of appeal. The introduction of the clause was criticised in
several quarters, including the Court of Appeal itself, where one
judge spoke of "the merits of the present rules which allow un-
restricted access to the Court of Appeal, in this field, where so
much of the litigation is directed to preventing alleged abuses of
power."5 In response to this opposition, a compromise clause was
49. See In re Poh, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 2 (H.L. 1982).
50. The final such occasion was in the context of Canadian constitutional issues and the
alleged treaty rights of Indian peoples in Canada. See R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte
Indian Ass'n, [1982] Q.B. 892 (C.A.). Lord Denning gave other examples in 459 PARL. DEB.,
HL. (5th ser.) 942-43 (1985).
51. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 925, 926 (addressing delay in applying for leave to apply for judicial
review).
52. 461 PARL. DES., H.L. (5th ser.) 461 (1985). Lord Hailsham added: "I know that the
noble Lord, Lord Denning, thinks he was not committing a constitutional monstrosity by
making the Court of Appeal a court of first instance; but he was." Id.
53. R. v. Commissioner for the Special Purposes of the Income Tax Acts, ex parte Stip-
plechoice Ltd., [1985] 2 All E.R. 465, 467 (C.A.) (Ackner L.J). The Court of Appeal also
expressed similar sentiments in R. v. Beverley County Ct., ex parte Brown, [1985] T.L.R.,
No. 40 (C.A. Jan. 25, 1985) (Purchas L.J.). In his capacity as Lord Chancellor, Lord Hail-
sham countered by saying that "when a matter is passing through Parliament it is utterly
improper in my judgment for a Court of Appeal judge or any other judge speaking on the
Bench to criticise matters passing through Parliament." 459 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 945
(1985).
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introduced, described by one peer as "in form a cosmetic amend-
ment which has been introduced for some face saving reason. ' ' 4
Lord Denning and others ensured that the proposal was finally
rejected in a vote of ninety-seven to eighty-two in the House of
Lords.55
This interlude in the House of Lords demonstrates the measure
of concern about existing procedures and safeguards associated
with the leave requirement. The retention of a leave requirement,
however, has been defended on various grounds. From the point of
view of the applicant, refusal of leave may be a blessing in disguise,
enabling him to discover speedily and at small cost to himself that
a particular case is very unlikely to succeed at a full hearing.5"
From the point of view of administration, the leave requirement
serves as a useful device in a number of ways. First, the application
must be supported by, among other things, an affidavit demon-
strating "uberrima fides," or the "most perfect good faith," "so
that a knowingly false statement of fact would amount to the crim-
inal offence of perjury," as Lord Diplock pointed out.57 Second, the
court has power to impose terms as to costs or security upon appli-
cants who are granted leave.58 Third, and more broadly, the re-
quirement of leave acts as a sieve, designed to ensure that public
authorities and third parties are not delayed "for any longer period
than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected" by
an administrative decision.59 In debate in the House of Lords, Lord
Hailsham L.C., after describing the process of judicial review as "a
very remarkable development of English law, mainly since the
war," referred to the need for a sieve or filter, drawing attention to
the burgeoning of case law in such countries as the United States
54. 461 PARL. DFB., H.L. (5th ser.) 454 (1985) (Lord Hutchinson).
55. Id. at 443-64. For a brief account of the background to the parliamentary proceedings,
see Council on Tribunals, Annual Report for 1984/85, H.C. Jou., Nov. 28, 1985, §§ 2.27-.29.
56. See REPORT ON REMEmEs, supra note 7, 38. An application made ex parte, however,
may be adjourned to enable the prospective respondent to be represented. The Rules of the
Supreme Court (Amendment No. 3), STAT. INST., 1977, No. 1955, § 5, rule 5(7).
57. O'Reilly, [1983] 2 A.C. at 280. Lord Diplock added: "[T]he requirement of a prior
application for leave to be supported by full and candid affidavits verifying the facts relied
on is an important safeguard against groundless or unmeritorious claims that a particular
decision is a nullity." Id. at 281.
58. Id. at 281.,
59. Id.
1986]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
and India. 0 Courts have seen that the purpose behind the leave
requirement
is to prevent the time of the court being wasted by busybodies
with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative error, and
to remove the uncertainty in which public officers and authori-
ties might be left as to whether they could safely proceed with
administrative action while proceedings for judicial review of it
were actually pending even though misconceived.61
2. Contrast With Standing Requirements Applicable in Ordi-
nary Actions
No leave requirement, of course, applies to ordinary actions for
declarations and injunctions. The "filter" recognised for such ac-
tions arises from the strict rule of standing that requires a plaintiff
to "show either an interference with some private right of his or an
interference with a public right from which he has suffered damage
peculiar to himself. '6 2 Counsel in one case argued that the filter,
almost as a parallel to the exercise of the court's discretion to grant
leave in Order 53 proceedings, is provided by the Attorney-
General's prerogative discretion to allow a case to proceed even in
the absence of standing.6 "
Advising a prospective plaintiff who wishes to sue a public au-
thority on some recognised ground of judicial review of administra-
tive action is not easy. In the first place, the scope of the rule of
standing is unclear, as recent Australian as well as English cases
60. 459 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 946 (1985).
61. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. National Fed'n of Self-Employed & Small Businesses
Ltd., [1982] A.C. 617, 643 (1981) (Lord Diplock); see also id. at 653 (Lord Scarman) (stating
that the leave requirement "enables the court to prevent abuse by busybodies, cranks, and
other mischief-makers"). A recent example of a case in which the Divisional Court refused
leave is R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Swati, [1986] T.L.R., No. 29 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. Jan.
30, 1986), which arose in the context of a person being refused leave to enter the United
Kingdom.
62. Barrs v. Bethell, [1982] Ch. 294, 306 (1981) (Warner J.) (citing Boyce v. Paddington
Borough Council, [1903] 1 Ch. 109 (1902) (Buckley J.), and Collins v. Lower Hutt City
Corp., [1961] N.Z.L.R. 250 (McGregor J.)); see also Steeples v. Derbyshire County Council,
[1985] 1 W.L.R. 256, 290-92 (Q.B. 1981) (Webster J.) (discussing the requirement of a pri-
vate right or special damage to a public right).
63. See Barrs v. Bethell, [1982] Ch. 294, 306 (1981) (Warner J.).
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have shown. 4 In one of the leading Australian decisions, the High
Court declined an invitation from counsel to disregard existing au-
thorities and to devise a rule "allowing standing to any private citi-
zen to enforce public duties, unless the court in its discretion con-
sidered it inadvisable that the action should be allowed to
proceed. s65 The invitation itself was tantamount to a request to
introduce a leave requirement. In the second place, the Attorney-
General's power to overcome problems of standing provides an-
other source of difficulty. The courts hitherto have been reluctant
to question this power, especially since a controversial case in 1977
in which the House of Lords overrode the Court of Appeal and
strongly endorsed the absolute nature of the Attorney-General's
discretion."6
The restiveness about the strict rule of standing applying to or-
dinary actions is not surprising because of the move toward a
greater liberalisation of the standing requirements in several juris-
dictions and in various contexts. In England, for instance, where
the term "person aggrieved" has been used with regard to certain
special statutory remedies," "a clearly discernible trend" away
from a strict view of standing has occurred. 8 In Australia, where
the term "a person who is aggrieved" appears in a major federal
statute on judicial review,69 one judge has argued that the words
"should not in my view be given a narrow construction. '70 Despite
64. See Onus v. Alcoa of Austl. Ltd., 149 C.L.R. 27 (Austl. H.C. 1981); Australian Conser-
vation Found. Inc. v. Commonwealth of Austl., 146 C.L.R. 493 (Austl. H.C. 1980) (discuss-
ing, among other cases, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)); REPORT ON REMEDIES,
supra note 7, 22, 27 (summarising English law concerning the subject).
65. Australian Conservation Found. Inc. v. Commonwealth of Austl., 146 C.L.R. 493, 528
(Austl. H.C. 1980) (Gibbs J.).
66. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] A.C. 435 (1977). For a discussion of
the political and legal background of Gouriet, see J. EDWARDS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 138-76 (1984).
67. See, e.g., Town and Country Planning Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 31(1).
68. See S. DE SMrrH, supra note 2, at 412 (citing, among other cases, Turner v. Secretary
of State, 28 P. & C.R. 123 (Q.B. 1974)). For an earlier and more restrictive interpretation of
"person aggrieved," see Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Gov't, [1961] 1 Q.B. 278
(1960).
69. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977, § 5(1).
70. Tooheys Ltd. v. Minister for Business & Consumer Affairs, 54 F.L.R. 421, 437 (Austl.
Fed. Ct. 1981) (Ellicott J.).
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frequent judicial support for more liberalised rules of standing,71
however, a certain uneasiness underlies any attempt to eliminate
rules of standing altogether. More liberal standing rules seemingly
would make judicial discretion as to remedy awards more impor-
tant,72 but a late check at the conclusion of a trial is unlikely to be
an acceptable substitute for a filter at the outset. This is when a
leave requirement, irrespective of its other features and advan-
tages, is significant, because the existence of this filter offers a re-
assurance for those who would wish to liberalise the rules of stand-
ing. Moreover, a leave requirement is a more flexible, less technical
device than the rules of standing. The experience with the new Or-
der 53 in England and Wales suggests that the judges have been
prepared to accept a substantial weakening of restrictions of locus
standi in the context of a remedy that requires leave to apply at
the threshold of litigation.
B. The Rules of Standing
In deciding whether to grant leave to apply for judicial review,
the High Court is obliged to consider whether the applicant "has a
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.
' 73
Different rules of standing existed for each of the prerogative or-
ders prior to 1977, but the move toward liberalisation of standing
rules, typified by Lord Justice Lawton's observation that "courts
have come a long way . . . in allowing grievances against persons
performing public duties and exercising statutory powers to be
given a hearing in the courts, ' 74 had affected prerogative orders as
71. In the Irish Supreme Court, for example, Justice Walsh noted that "restrictive rules
about standing are, in general, inimical to a healthy system of administrative law." State
(Lynch) v. Cooney, [1982] I.R. 337, 368 (Ir. S.C.). Courts in several other Commonwealth
jurisdictions have shared this view. See, e.g., Rowley v. New S. Wales Leather & Trading
Co. Pty. Ltd., 46 L.G.R.A. 250 (N.S.W. Land & Env't Ct. 1980) (Cripps J.); In re Energy
Probe & Atomic Energy Control Bd., 8 D.L.R.4th 735 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1984); Environmental
Defence Soc'y Inc. v. South Pac. Aluminum Ltd. (No. 3), [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 216, 220-21
(N.Z.C.A.).
72. Rowley v. New S. Wales Leather & Trading Co. Pty. Ltd., 46 L.G.R.A. 250, 256-57
(N.S.W. Land & Env't Ct. 1980) (Cripps J.).
73. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 31(3).
74. R. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, ex parte National Fed'n of Self-Employed & Small
Businesses Ltd., [1980] Q.B. 407, 428 (C.A.) (Lawton L.J.), reu'd, [1982] A.C. 617 (1981); see
B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, supra note 19, at 291-96.
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well as some other remedies. A striking example of this liberalisa-
tion was Regina v. Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn,5
in which the Court of Appeal, in a case concerning cinema licences
and allegedly indecent films, held that the applicants had standing
to seek an order of prohibition. In his judgment, Lord Denning
MR emphasised that one of the applicants "is a citizen of
London. His wife is a ratepayer. He has children who may be
harmed by the exhibition of pornographic films. If he has no suffi-
cient interest, no other citizen has. '76 Lord Denning repeated his
assertion in an earlier case about the constitutional importance of
ensuring access to the courts when "'a public authority is trans-
gressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends
or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects.' ")77
The reform of Order 53 and the introduction of the concept of
"sufficient interest" created questions about the position of stand-
ing rules after 1977. The legal community regarded revival of the
older technical limitations on locus standi as inconceivable, and
the Law Commission intended the new formula to be one that al-
lowed "for further development of the requirement of standing by
the courts having regard to the relief which is sought. 7 8 Despite
this guidance, the provision in the new Order 53 concerning stand-
ing provided no clear answers to several important questions, in-
cluding what test of "sufficient interest" should be adopted in the
courts, whether that test should apply in a similar fashion to all
five remedies incorporated in the application for judicial review,
and whether standing should be resolved solely at the stage of
seeking leave or at the inter partes hearing of an application at
both stages. The opportunity to seek answers to such questions
came early on, in Regina v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex
75. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550 (C.A.).
76. Id. at 558-59.
77. Id. at 559 (quoting Attorney-General ex rel. McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting
Auth., [1973] Q.B. 629, 646 (C.A.)). Lord Diplock associated himself with this assertion in
Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. National Fed'n of Self-Employed & Small Businesses Ltd.,
[1982] A.C. 617, 641 (1981).
78. REPORT ON REMEDIES, supra note 7, 1 48. The Commission further stated: "[A]ny at-
tempt to define in precise terms the nature of the standing required would run the risk of
imposing an undesirable rigidity" in the law. Id.
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parte National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Businesses
Ltd.,79 which is commonly known as the Fleet Street Casuals case.
The National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Busi-
nesses, "good men and true who pay their taxes," 80 raised the com-
plaint in that case that the revenue authorities had acted
unlawfully in granting what was in effect an amnesty to some cas-
ual employees working for national newspapers. These casual em-
ployees apparently had been evading taxes by supplying fictitious
names and addresses when receiving their pay, including, in one
instance, "Mickey Mouse of Sunset Boulevard." When the extent
of the wide-scale practice had been discovered, the revenue author-
ities had come to a special arrangement with the employers and
trade unions, which had entailed a strict requirement as to true
names for the future and an amnesty for past violations. The fed-
eration saw this settlement as preferential treatment, perhaps in-
spired by union pressure and the possibility of industrial action,
and it sought judicial review.8 1 Leave to apply was granted, but the
question of standing was raised as a preliminary issue to be deter-
mined ahead of a hearing of the merits of the application.
At first instance, the Divisional Court ruled against the federa-
tion. One judge touched on the familiar "floodgates" argument,
suggesting that, if the applicants in this case were entitled to apply
under Order 53, "then so [were] any one of the other 25 million
persons in this country who pay tax. If the court adopted that ap-
proach it would be swamped with applications by persons who
were aggrieved with the administration. 8 2 In the Court of Appeal,
Lord Justice Lawton expressed similar sentiments. With a glancing
claim that "the courts should be slow to listen to the barking of
the dog in the manger," 88 Lord Justice Lawton drew attention to
"the mischief which was likely to arise if public officers could be
sued by anyone with a grievance":8
79. [1980] 2 All E.R. 378 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.), rev'd, [1980] Q.B. 407 (C.A.), rev'd, [1982] A.C.
617 (1981).
80. [1980] Q.B. at 419 (Lord Denning).
81. Id. at 418-19.
82. [1980] 2 All E.R. at 387 (Griffiths J.).
83. [1980] Q.B. at 427.
84. Id. at 428.
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A line has to be drawn somewhere. If this application is put on
the side of the line where the federation want [sic] it to be, any-
one's genuine concern for good and lawful government, whether
at a national or local level, would be a sufficient interest to jus-
tify a judicial review. This would entangle the courts with ad-
ministration in a way which would be inconvenient and uncon-
stitutional. Such is the flexibility of our unwritten constitution
that the lack of a remedy in the courts does not mean that jus-
tice may not be done elsewhere.85
The majority of the Court of Appeal, however, adopted a differ-
ent stance, holding as a preliminary issue that the federation had
standing. Lord Denning M.R. reviewed the authorities on standing,
assessed the facts and statutory context of the case, and said:
[I]f the Revenue authorities are found to be exercising a dis-
pensing power-not given to them by Parliament-then it is
open to a representative body of taxpayers-representative of
the whole-to come to the courts to complain of it: and to seek a
declaration as to the rights or wrongs of it.88
The House of Lords overruled this divided decision of the Court
of Appeal but, not surprisingly given the admission in the Court of
Appeal that "the law as to who can ask the courts to set in motion
remedies for public grievances is confused and in need of clarifica-
tion,' 87 the speeches in the House of Lords reflected differences of
approach. Broadly speaking, the House of Lords held that the stat-
utory framework in which the revenue authorities operated was not
appropriate for the grant of standing in this case. The Lords em-
phasised the "total confidentiality of assessments and of negotia-
tions between individuals and the revenue,"88 and the absence of
any evidence to suggest that the revenue authorities acted other
than "in the bona fide exercise of the wide managerial discretion
conferred on them by statute."89 The individual speeches of the
five members of the House of Lords who spoke contained surveys
or summaries of the older law governing standing, particularly the
85. Id.
86. Id. at 424.
87. Id. at 425 (Lawton L.J.).
88. [1982] A.C. at 633 (Lord Wilberforce).
89. Id. at 637 (Lord Diplock).
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law relating to the prerogative orders, and they generally
recognised that many of the older decisions concerning standing
were now of little relevance. The Lords differed, however, concern-
ing whether any distinctions between the five remedies had sur-
vived with respect to standing. Lord Diplock thought not,90 but
Lord Wilberforce spoke of the different character of the relief
sought in the five remedies, urging that "we should be unwise in
our enthusiasm for liberation from procedural fetters to discard
reasoned authorities" concerning different rules of standing.91 This
apparent divergence of views probably is not important, however,
given Lord Wilberforce's realisation that the process of judicial re-
view cannot stand still, and the apparent assumption of both Lord
Wilberforce and Lord Diplock that courts still would take various
approaches to standing through a case-by-case, statute-by-statute
development.
The importance of another divergence of opinion also can be
overstated. Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman saw standing as
bound up in the merits of the case, and they deemed that the fed-
eration did not have standing because it had failed to show ultra
vires action on the part of the revenue authorities. Lord Diplock
declared:
It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public
law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single pub-
lic-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules
of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the
court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct
stopped.92
The other members of the House of Lords were more hesitant,
subscribing instead to the view "that in general it is not open to
individual taxpayers or to a group of taxpayers to seek to interfere
between the [revenue] and other taxpayers."9 This attempt firmly
to discourage interference by other taxpayers, however, by seeing
the standing issue as a matter of principle rather than as some-
thing to emerge from a consideration of the specific allegations of
90. See id. at 638.
91. Id. at 631.
92. Id. at 644.
93. Id. at 663 (Lord Roskill).
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illegality, was seriously weakened by acceptance of a major excep-
tion. According to the three Lords who advocated this position, the
principle could have been waived if the case had been "of sufficient
gravity,"94 if it had involved "some exceptionally grave or wide-
spread illegality,"95 or if the revenue authorities had failed in their
duty because of "some grossly improper pressure or motive."96 A
rule that would require courts to differentiate between degrees of
illegality when making determinations on standing, however, would
be unfortunate.9 7 A simple acceptance of the merging of standing
and merits would seem the preferable approach.
Although the decision of the House of Lords was not directed
principally to the requirement of leave, the statutory provision
governing standing for Order 53 does state that a court ought not
to grant leave unless it considers the applicant to have a sufficient
interest in the matter related to the application. 8 In spite of this
express linking of standing to the application for leave, the House
of Lords effectively has indicated that the scope for consideration
of standing at that stage should be narrow. Leave might be refused
to prevent "the courts being flooded and public bodies harassed by
irresponsible applications,"99 "to prevent the time of the court be-
ing wasted by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of
administrative error," 100 and "to prevent abuse by busybodies,
cranks, and other mischief-makers." 101 A more specific example,
which involved one of the applicants in Blackburn,10 2 was given by
94. Id. at 633 (Lord Wilberforce).
95. Id. at 647 (Lord Fraser).
96. Id. at 662 (Lord Roskill). In R. v. Commissioners of the Boundary Comm'n for Eng-
land, ex parte Gateshead Borough Council, [1983] T.L.R., No. 7 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. Jan. 5,
1983), afl'd sub nom. R. v. Boundary Comm'n for England, ex parte Foot, [1983] 1 Q.B. 600
(C.A.), the court also referred to an exception for "a matter of sufficient gravity," id., and
Lord Justice Oliver also articulated an exception for cases involving "a clear and grave
breach of duty," id. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal expressed no view concerning
locus standi. See [1983] 1 Q.B. at 624-25, 634. For very useful discussions of the merging of
standing and merits, see P. CRAIG, supra note 2, at 418-60; Cane, Standing, Legality and the
Limits of Public Law, 1981 PuB. L. 322.
97. See Case and Comment, Mickey Mouse and Standing in Administrative Law, 41
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 6, 8 (1982).
98. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 31(3).
99. Fleet Street Casuals, [1982] A.C. at 630 (Lord Wilberforce).
100. Id. at 643 (Lord Diplock).
101. Id. at 653 (Lord Scarman).
102. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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Lord Justice Ackner in Fleet Street Casuals: "[I]f Mr. Blackburn
had lived, for example in Penzance or Newcastle, it might well be
contended that he could not reasonably assert that he had a genu-
ine grievance, because he was so remote from where the alleged
breach of statutory duty was said to have occurred. 1 03 Another
example comes from a case in New South Wales, 104 which con-
cerned a statute that included a provision allowing "any person" to
bring proceedings for a breach. 105 In that case, a judge referred to
"the interesting argument" as to "whether a Norwegian who has
never set foot in New South Wales and who owned no property
would have the standing to seek an order. ... 6 In England,
such a person doubtless would fall foul of the leave requirement
under Order 53, even given the greater proximity of Norway to the
United Kingdom.
The very existence of the leave requirement in England seems to
deflect worry either about trivial or irresponsible proceedings or,
more generally, about opening the floodgates in judicial review,
even for those who accept the concept that the "idle and whimsical
litigant," "a dilettante who litigates for a lark," is "a specter which
haunts the legal literature, not the courtroom."' 0 7 In the words of
one English judge:
[T]he fact that leave was required in judicial review proceedings
and was required before prerogative orders prior to the new [Or-
der 53], was a significant factor to be taken into account in the
approach to locus standi, since the requirement of leave pro-
vided a necessary filter to prevent frivolous actions by persons
who had no sufficient interest in the result of the proceedings. 08
103. [1980] Q.B. at 432 (citing R. v. Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn, [1976]
1 W.L.R. 550 (C.A.)); see also R. v. Oxford, ex parte Levey, [1985] T.L.R., No. 711 (Q.B.
Div'l Ct. Dec. 18, 1985) (Watkins L.J.) (disallowing leave because applicant "did not live in
Toxeth, had no business there, nor did the incident take place there").
104. Rowley v. New S. Wales Leather & Trading Co. Pty. Ltd., 46 L.G.R.A. 250 (N.S.W.
Land & Env't Ct. 1980) (Cripps J.).
105. Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1977, § 123.
106. Rowley v. New S. Wales Leather & Trading Co. Pty. Ltd., 46 L.G.R.A. 250, 256
(N.S.W. Land & Env't Ct. 1980) (Cripps J.).
107. See PUBLIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, NEW ZEALAND, STANDING
IN ADMINISTRATIvE LAW, 1978, No. 11, 1 9-13; LAW REFORM COMMISSION, AUSTRALIA, ACCESS
TO COURTS I-STANDING: PUBLIC INTEREST SUITS, 1978, WORKING PAPER No. 7, at 6-8.
108. Notes of Cases, Covent Garden Community Ass'n Ltd. v. Greater London Council
(Queen's Bench Division, Woolf J., April 2, 1980), 1981 J. OF PLAN. & ENV'T L. 183, 184.
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After leave is granted, one is closer to a situation involving "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends."'' 09 Even so, "the provi-
sional finding" or prima facie showing of sufficient interest is
"subject to revisal later on," 1 0 when standing can be assessed fully
"together with the legal and factual context" of the case."'
Lord Denning M.R. claimed, ahead of the House of Lords' deci-
sion in Fleet Street Casuals, that the decision of the divided Court
of Appeal "showed that a public-spirited citizen was entitled to
come to court to be heard if he could point to a failure by a public
authority to do the duty which in the public interest should be
remedied. 1" 2 This claim in the end has been justified. The case
law since the ruling of the House of Lords has confirmed both the
merging of standing and merits and a sustained liberalising ap-
proach toward standing, akin to that expressed by Lord Denning
and by Lord Diplock.11
Even taxpayers have been permitted their say in court. In one
decision in which the revenue authorities allegedly were adopting a
wrong approach to the valuation of ethane, Woolf J. said: "It
would be regrettable if a court had to come to the conclusion that
in a situation where the need for the intervention of the court had
been established that intervention was prevented by rules as to
standing."1 4 In another case, a citizen unsuccessfully sought judi-
cial review with regard to an important draft Order in Council." 5
Sir John Donaldson M.R. went out of his way, however, to say that
he would have been "extremely surprised" if rules of standing had
109. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (Brennan, J.).
110. Fleet Street Casuals, [1982] A.C. at 645 (Lord Fraser).
111. Id. at 630 (Lord Wilberforce).
112. R. v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, ex parte Blackburn, The Times of London, Mar.
7, 1980, at 10, col. 5 (C.A. Mar. 6, 1980). At the conclusion of the case, the unsuccessful
applicant referred to Lord Denning as the "greatest living Englishman." Id. Lord Denning
replied: "Tell that to the House of Lords." Id. col. 8.
113. See, e.g., Cane, supra note 96; C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 284-310.
114. R. v. Attorney General, ex parte Imperial Chem. Indus. plc, [1985] T.L.R., No. 90
(Q.B. Feb. 12, 1985); see also R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Ward, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 834,
843-46 (Q.B. 1983) (Woolf J.) (discussing the right of an applicant to seek relief by way of
judicial review).
115. R. v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte Smedley, [1985] Q.B. 657 (C.A. 1984).
1986]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
stood in the way of the applicant,116 and one of his appellate col-
leagues said:
If the court had taken the view that Mr. Smedley's application
was of a frivolous nature, the wide discretion given it by R.S.C.,
Ord. 53 would have enabled it to dispose of it appropriately.
There has, however, been no suggestion that it is of this nature.
It raises a serious question as to the powers of Her Majesty in
Council to make an Order in Council in the form of the draft
now before Parliament. The making of any such Order would be
likely to be followed automatically by the expenditure by the
government of substantial sums from the Consolidated
Fund. . . . I do not feel much doubt that Mr. Smedley, if only
in his capacity as a taxpayer, has sufficient locus standi to raise
this question by way of an application for judicial review .... 11
Other cases in a variety of contexts show the relaxation of the
old rules of standing. In a case involving the functions of the Reg-
istrar of Companies, for example, the trial judge looked at issues of
standing "now that all the evidence is in and the matter has been
fully argued,""l 8 and both he and the Court of Appeal were disin-
clined to revert to any of the older rigidities.119 One legitimately
could ask, then, whether this same approach should not apply
outside the ambit of Order 53. If the liberal rules apply to declara-
tions and injunctions within Order 53, why not to declarations and
injunctions sought in ordinary actions? In a 1981 decision issued
just before the ruling of the House of Lords in Fleet Street Casu-
als, one judge, anxious not to make "an ass of the law,' 120 held
116. Id. at 667.
117. Id. at 669-70 (Slade L.J.); see also In re Preston, [1985] A.C. 835 (allowing taxpayer
standing to challenge action by the Inland Revenue Commissioners).
118. R. v. Registrar of Companies, ex parte Esal (Commodities) Ltd. (in liq.), [1985] 2
W.L.R. 447, 467 (Q.B. 1984) (Mervyn Davies J.), rev'd sub nom. R. v. Registrar of Compa-
nies, ex parte Central Bank of India, [19861 2 W.L.R. 177 (C.A. 1985).
119. See R. v. Registrar of Companies, ex parte Central Bank of India, [1986] 2 W.L.R.
177, 184-85 (C.A. 1985) (Dillon L.J.). For general discussions of standing under Order 53, see
R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Child Poverty Action Group, [1985] T.L.R., No. 512 (C.A.
Aug. 8, 1985); R. v. Independent Broadcasting Auth., ex parte Whitehouse, [1984] T.L.R.,
No. 243 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. Apr. 14, 1984), rev'd, [1985] T.L.R., No. 228 (C.A. Apr. 4, 1985); R. v.
Hainmersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte People Before Profit Ltd., 80
Knight's Local Gov't R. 322 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1981); P. BiRKINSHAW, supra note 2, at 171.
120. Steeples v. Derbyshire County Council, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 256, 296 (Q.B. 1981) (Web-
ster J.).
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that the same rules now should apply. This view, however, was
firmly rejected by another judge, who declared that "the crucial
difference" between the two types of remedies is that ordinary ac-
tions can be brought as of right, whereas an application for judicial
review requires the leave of the court.121 These cases provide yet
another reminder of the central importance in the English admin-
istrative law system of the requirement of leave at the threshold of
Order 53 proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the most difficult problems in any system of administra-
tive law is drawing a line to indicate how far the courts may go in
intervening in administrative decisionmaking. Such decisions im-
plicate issues of judicial restraint, of sensible enumeration of the
grounds of review, and of administrative reaction to judicial re-
view. Hitherto, at least in England and Wales, the procedural rules
governing remedies have been treated as virtually irrelevant to
wider arguments about the scope of judicial review. Now that
many of the older technical limitations have been abandoned, ei-
ther by the courts themselves or through the direct impact of the
new Order 53, the importance of the remedies can be more readily
appreciated.
Administrative law in England and Wales is being entrusted
more and more to judges who are familiar with and versed in ad-
ministrative law. The new, streamlined remedy under Order 53 is
looked upon more and more as the overriding avenue of access in
judicial review of administrative action. Within Order 53 proceed-
ings, the requirement of leave has enabled the courts to be more
confident in relaxing the rules on locus standi, and the existence of
a leave requirement perhaps has served as a reassurance to admin-
istrators as well. These advantages do not necessarily indicate that
the requirement of leave, or any of the other procedural devices in
Order 53, could be transplanted easily to another legal system. The
leave requirement, however, has been a vital element in the ma-
chinery of English administrative law during the first decade of the
new application for judicial review.
121. Barrs v. BetheU, [1982] Ch. 294, 313 (1981) (Warner J.).
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